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In the Shadow of Tolerance:  
the discursive context of Dutch-born Muslim youth 
MAYIDA ZAAL 
Montclair State University, New Jersey, USA 
ABSTRACT Despite a public discourse on tolerance, anxiety about immigrants, Islam and the 
preservation of Dutch values has amplified fear of Muslim youth in the Netherlands. In this context, 
Dutch-born Muslim youth endure social and systemic discrimination that affects all aspects of their 
futures, including available educational opportunities and eventually their prospects for employment. 
Based on a one-year qualitative study conducted in Amsterdam, this article explores the lived 
experience of Dutch-born Muslim youth caught at the intersection of national policies and local 
realities. Grounded in critical literature originating in the Netherlands and in Europe, this inquiry 
triangulates participant observations, focus groups with youth (n = 25) and interviews with youth 
workers (n = 25) to disclose the hostile discursive contexts faced by Muslim youth. Findings indicate 
that anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant discourses permeate the everyday experiences of Muslim youth, 
including the practices and structures of youth programs they attend. The study raises questions about 
multicultural policies that appear progressive and attempt to build social cohesion but may in fact 
further alienate and oppress Muslim youth. It also reveals how Muslim youth navigate oppression by 
agentically constructing their identities while resisting the dehumanizing categories in which they are 
placed. 
Despite a strong public discourse on tolerance, anxieties about immigrants, Islam and the 
preservation of a perceived Eurocentric homogeneity have amplified fear of Muslim youth 
(namely, Moroccans and Turks) in the Netherlands (Essed, 2009). In this discursive landscape, 
Muslim youth (many of whom were born in the Netherlands) struggle for a sense of belonging. 
Positioned as ‘other’ (Said, 1979) in social and cultural spheres, they become vulnerable targets 
(Roes, 2008) and are classified as a problem (Lucassen, n.d.; Verkuyten & Thijs, 2009). Most 
Muslim youth live in segregated neighborhoods where they attend segregated schools known as 
zwarte scholen (black schools). Furthermore, Muslim youth are over-represented in the lowest 
academic and vocational tracks in secondary schools, impeding their access to higher education 
(Crul & Holdaway, 2009). This lower educational attainment (compared with their native-Dutch 
counterparts), compounded by discrimination in the labor market, has led to high unemployment 
rates (Thomson & Crul, 2007) for this population. 
In recent decades, ‘tolerance’ as a Dutch value has framed national policies and local practices 
designed to address the ‘immigrant problem’ (Lucassen, n.d.). These include policies of integration 
intended to promote the preservation of immigrant languages and cultures (but aimed at the 
assimilation of immigrants into Dutch society), as well as policies of social cohesion aimed at 
creating dialogue between native Dutch and ethnic minority groups. However, it is clear that the 
deficit language used in these liberal policies supports the culture-of-poverty framework (see 
Driessen, 2001; te Nijenhuis & van der Flier, 2001) driving many local practices related to Muslim 
youth. Furthermore, the perception of Dutch ‘tolerance’ masks Muslim youths’ experience of 
exclusion and marginalization (Opotow, 2005; Sirin & Fine, 2008). In the shadow of tolerance, 
young people’s experience of racism and discrimination is often vehemently denied. Within this 
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complex and oppressive field, Muslim youth must narrate their lived realities, construct their 
identities, and negotiate borders of belonging and exclusion while crafting new possibilities and 
visions for self and community. 
Based on a 12-month study conducted over three years, this article explores the contradictory 
discourses of tolerance and Islamophobia (Fekete, 2008; Aouragh, 2009; Allen, 2010; Shryock, 2010) 
that permeate the lived experiences of Dutch-born Muslim youth seeking support from educational 
youth programs in Amsterdam. In both the study and this article, I define ‘discourse’ as a social 
behavior mediated through language. Discursive behavior is in itself an action which ‘possesses 
power’ and ‘constitutes reality’ (Jäger, 1993, cited in Wodak & Reisigl, 1999, p. 193). The discursive 
themes of tolerance and Islamophobia as mediated by policy and history surfaced throughout the 
course of the study and the period of fieldwork within multiple contexts and across participant 
groups (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Grounded in critical literature originating in the Netherlands 
and in Europe (Essed, 1990; van der Veer, 2006; Vasta, 2007; Aouragh, 2009), this study triangulated 
findings from focus groups and interviews with young people, interviews with adults and 
participant observations to reveal both explicit and implicit examples of the dominant discourses 
(Wodak & Reisigl, 1999; Van Dijk, 2004; Goldberg, 2006; Prins, 2010) and the counter narratives 
(Abu El-Haj, 2009; Lalvani, 2011; Rios-Rojas, 2011) present in multiple domains of the lives of 
youth participants. Committed to critical research from the perspectives of those who are most 
affected by social, historical and political turmoil (Suárez-Orozco et al, 2008), I present these 
findings through the narratives of youth participants and the adults who work with them. It is 
important to note that these discourses – tolerance and Islamophobia – are only two of the 
significant discourses that exist in relationship to Muslim-origin youth in the Netherlands. Other 
discourses, including the discourse of criminality (Long, 2011b; Martineau, 2006), are bracketed in 
this analysis. 
Methods 
The stories of young people and the concerned adults who worked with them revealed the 
multiple layers of exclusion and racism young people face. I had not anticipated such a high level of 
complexity and contradiction, and many issues alarmed me, including the commitment (and 
loyalty) to the status quo expressed by some, and the numbness and normalcy with which others 
responded to oppressive daily realities. Throughout our interactions, it was clear that participants 
wanted to help me, the ‘foreign’ scholar, understand just how bad it really was. Early in my 
fieldwork, I talked to adults about the experiences of Muslim youth in the context of supplemental 
education programs (Zhou & Kim, 2006), the goals of the organizations for which they worked, or 
the issues facing Muslim youth in the Netherlands. In these conversation concerns, contradictions 
or worries about tolerance, social cohesion, and the representation of Muslims (and in some cases 
specifically Moroccans) inevitably surfaced. Believing, as Josselson (2004) conveys, that ‘a told story 
conceals an untold one’ (p. 13), these early conversations led me to question further the ways in 
which these discourses affected the lives of Muslim youth. 
Epistemologically, my study positioned young people as experts of their own lives (Freire, 
1993; Cammarota & Fine, 2008; Torre, 2009); therefore, the methods used focused on soliciting 
their perspectives on the discursive currents in the Netherlands. In an effort to view ‘social 
phenomena holistically’ and provide ‘panoramic views rather than micro-analyses’ (Guba & 
Lincoln, 1994, p.112), I used the ecological model (Bronfenbrenner, 1977) to situate participants in 
their socio-cultural, political and historical contexts. The youth participants, supported by the 
adults and my observations, provided the counter story – one in which they constructed their own 
identities, negotiated borders of exclusion and resisted being framed as a problem. 
Sample and Data Collection 
Youth participants. This study employed ethnographic methods: interviews and focus groups with 
youth participants (n = 25); interviews with mentors and program administrators (n = 25); and 
participant observations conducted at youth programs and community events (n = 21). The 25 
youth participants in this study all belonged to the second generation (i.e. they have at least one 
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foreign-born parent). All were children of North African immigrants (mostly Moroccan), and at the 
time of the study all were between 11 and 17 years of age. They self-identified and were identified 
by others as allochtonen, the Dutch word for foreigners, and as Muslims. Therefore, the categories 
of immigrant-origin (Suárez-Orozco & Suárez-Orozco, 2001) and Muslim (Brubaker, 2012) served 
as units of analysis. Youth participants completed demographic questionnaires in Dutch that 
focused on multiple dimensions of religious, ethnic and linguistic identity. All participated in six 
focus groups (Wilkinson, 1999) in which they were asked about: (1) their participation in youth 
programs; (2) the educational support they received; and (3) the perceptions of Muslims they 
believed were part of the Dutch imaginary. A research assistant conducted the focus groups in 
Dutch while I recorded field notes. The audio recordings of the focus group discussions were 
transcribed and then translated into English. 
 
Adult participants. To contextualize the youth narratives, I conducted interviews with adults. Of 
these interviews (all conducted in English), 13 were formal (using a semi-structured protocol) and 
12 were informal. The formal interviews were audio recorded and transcribed, and the informal 
interviews were documented in field notes. The majority of the adults interviewed had years of 
experience as youth workers (the general designation used in the Netherlands). In addition to their 
professional experiences, their positionality (i.e. immigrant status, age, class, gender, ethnic origin 
and religious affiliation) provided a range of lenses that informed their responses (Denzin, 1989). 
For instance, the adults who were first-generation immigrants had different perspectives about the 
discursive context and the role of the state from their second-generation counterparts. 
 
Sampling strategies. Participants were recruited in 13 youth programs that served as sampling sites. 
While the selected programs were not individually evaluated nor a representative sample, the 
range and variety of the programs in terms of scale, location, and goals typified the plethora of 
educational support programs available throughout the city of Amsterdam. This range of programs 
in my sample added to the conceptual generalizability (Bhavani, 1994) of the study’s findings. It is 
important to note that many of the youth programs sampled for this study received state funding 
that resulted from integration policies and concerns about the radicalization of Muslim youth 
(Martineau, 2006). Therefore, the sampling sites served as microcosms reflecting the dominant 
narratives present in Dutch society. 
Method of Analysis 
I coded transcripts and field notes, identifying the dominant narratives about and the counter 
narratives from youth participants in terms of their status as immigrant origin, working class, and 
Muslim. The prevalent discourses that emerged framed Muslim youth as being intolerant relative 
to the Dutch value of tolerance. Moreover, discourses in regard to young people’s religious 
affiliation and/or practice were also prevalent across multiple data sources. To generate a 
framework of discursive patterns, I crosschecked these two major themes and findings across the 
adult and youth sample (Miles & Huberman, 1994), and then further triangulated (Webb, 2000) 
using participant observations. With the intent of conducting ‘cross-cultural research ... grounded 
in the communities in which the research emerges’ (Suárez-Orozco et al, 2008, p. 15), I engaged 
participants and members of the immigrant community in member checks (Guba & Lincoln, 1989) 
to verify my analysis of the discursive practices. 
Presumed Tolerant 
Tolerance is always expressed towards the tolerated ... from the tolerating agent’s position of 
power. I have the power and position to tolerate you. I am active; you the tolerated passive, 
powerless to affect me in my tolerating save to get under my skin, make me even less accepting of 
your distinction. My social power to tolerate you turns on all those like me likewise disposed 
towards you. (Goldberg, 2006, pp. 338-339) 
The value placed by the Dutch on tolerance is recognized worldwide. For example, the 
Netherlands is internationally respected for its vanguard policies legalizing same-sex marriage, and 
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as the country that hosts the International Court of Justice where crimes against humanity are 
prosecuted. These and other concrete displays of tolerance have shaped the self-perception of the 
Dutch populace (Wodak et al, 1999), who believe they are a nation accepting of difference where 
multiple cultures and faiths live in harmony (Aouragh, 2009; Essed, 2009; Long, 2011a). But who is 
tolerated and what is tolerated is subjective, making tolerance an abstract and often repressive 
concept (Brown, 2006; Goodey, 2006). Moreover, as Goldberg (2006) noted (above), tolerance is an 
expression of acceptance in which the person doing the tolerating holds the power to decide who is 
to be tolerated and who is not, resulting in a binary that creates a category of ‘other’ (Said, 1979; 
Brown, 2006). 
Historically speaking, the Dutch have not demonstrated tolerance toward new immigrants. 
The Muslim second generation in the Netherlands are the descendants of immigrants who 
migrated in the 1960s and 1970s (mainly from Morocco and Turkey) through ‘guest worker’ 
programs that were commonplace in Europe in the post-World War II period (Koopmans et al, 
2005; Lucassen, 2005). The experience was contentious, and Dutch society denied recognition of 
Muslim immigrants as permanent settlers (Lucassen, 2005; Ersanili, 2007). Despite poor working 
conditions, many made the Netherlands their home. Family reunification policies in the 1970s 
made it possible for women and children to join men who had emigrated without them. Today, 
the Dutch-born children of Turkish and Moroccan Muslim immigrants make up the fastest-
growing ethnic groups in the Netherlands (a country of 16.5 million inhabitants, of which about 
one million are Muslim [FORUM, 2010]). The passing of decades has not eased antipathy toward 
these immigrants. According to the Pews Global Attitudes Project (2005), Islamic Extremism: 
common concern for Muslim and western publics, which compared popular views about Jews, 
Christians and Muslims within countries in the West, of nine countries listed, including the United 
States, people in the Netherlands had the most unfavorable view (45%-51%) of Muslims in their 
society. 
Although the Dutch Constitution begins with an anti-discrimination statement, the level of 
tolerance towards immigrants and their Dutch-born children, in practice, has contradicted that 
promise and cannot be considered as an exemplar for other nations. For example, the 1981 
Minorities Memorandum, a policy undergirded by the Dutch value of tolerance, introduced the 
concept of integration, but the meaning of integration remains widely contested. The notion of 
diversity, according to Ersanili (2007), became ‘increasingly seen as something that obstructs 
integration’ (p. 1). What began as an effort to help minorities maintain their cultural identity 
eventually morphed into a policy centered on assimilating immigrants into Dutch society by 
stripping them of their language and requiring them to abandon their loyalties to culture and 
religion (Vasta, 2007; Buijs, 2009). 
An Intolerant Reality 
During my fieldwork, tolerance as a Dutch value (however riddled with contradictions) was often 
raised in interviews and focus groups. All of the young people in this study expressed concerns 
about the prevailing negative stereotypes of Muslim (specifically Moroccan) youth. They recounted 
how these stereotypes could lead to them being excluded and shunned in school, on the 
playground and in the labor market. For example, they were tired of watching old women grab 
their bags tightly in fear or cross the street to avoid them. Musa, a 12-year-old boy attending an 
after-school homework group, expressed, ‘I really don’t want them [native Dutch] to think 
negative about me ... otherwise I will be refused job applications or something, and, uh, 
friendships.’ He later added: 
They [native Dutch] said ... a big part of Moroccans steal, and they involve all of us in it too ... 
and, yes, sometimes you just can’t go to the playground, for example when all Dutch people play 
soccer together and, uh, and you ask if you can join, they usually all refuse. 
His groupmate, 13-year-old Ahmed, worried that the negative stereotypes led native Dutch people 
to ‘only think about the problems they have with us. And, they don’t look at the good things about 
us.’ Like her peers, Inas, a 14-year-old participant, recognized that intolerance was not simply a 
social ill with which Muslim youth must reckon – it was an exclusionary force that affected their 
ability to attend school, to feel a sense of belonging, and to dream and envision their future 
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possibilities. Inas shared, ‘I don’t want to go to school because [name of school] is disorganized and 
they are a bit racist.’ Like the other youth participants in this study, Ahmed, Musa and Inas 
articulated the ways in which they were affected by the negative perceptions about Muslims in the 
Netherlands. 
The Dutch rhetoric of tolerance also undergirds judgmental attitudes toward the behavior of 
Muslim youth, who are accused of lacking tolerance for Dutch holidays and traditions. During one 
of my observations, I joined a group of mentors and immigrant-origin youth on a field trip to an 
event commemorating the Day of Remembrance, a holiday honoring Holocaust victims and the 
Dutch citizens who died in World War II. The purpose of attending this event, as leaders of the 
organization told me, was to teach immigrant-origin youth about Dutch history and, most 
importantly, to teach them to respect Dutch traditions. Hundreds (mainly middle-aged native 
Dutch people) marched in silence from Museumplein to Dam Square. When the young people in 
our group (aged 11 to 13) whispered to one another, several adults not involved with the 
organization shushed them. I found it odd that with Queen Beatrix and other dignitaries in 
attendance, it was the young people in our group who garnered the most media attention, 
particularly the veiled Muslim girls in the group. At Dam Square, the young people waited 
patiently for their turn to lay flowers on the monument as numerous dignitaries spoke in honor of 
lives lost. The mentors complained that it was too cold to have the children outdoors for that many 
hours; still, the young people watched excitedly as Queen Beatrix walked through the crowd. An 
older Dutch woman, curious about their presence at the event, asked one of the boys in the group 
if they were Moroccan, to which he replied, ‘Some of us are. But we’re all allochtonen [of immigrant 
origin].’ One of the mentors commented to me that their presence challenged the stereotype native 
Dutch had about rowdy and disrespectful Muslim youth (an idea that had been fueled the previous 
year when several youth were seen on surveillance cameras kicking around one of the flower 
wreaths placed at the monument). As a result, the young people I observed were burdened with 
the responsibility of demonstrating in front of TV cameras and the nation’s dignitaries that they 
were indeed tolerant. The idea that Muslim and other immigrant origin youth needed to be taught 
tolerance did not sit well with several of the mentors with whom I spoke. Further, Karim, another 
mentor at the event, shared that acknowledging racism and discrimination would be viewed as 
victimization; therefore, youth workers were discouraged to discuss these issues openly with 
young people. 
Unraveling Tolerance 
Dutch tolerance began to publicly unravel in 2004 after the public and brutal murder of Theo van 
Gogh (Goldberg, 2006). Van Gogh, a filmmaker and media personality whose murder was 
considered ‘a threat to openness and social cohesion’ (Buijs, 2009, p. 422) was regarded as edgy and 
admired for being controversial. His references to Muslims left many with mouths gaping and gave 
others permission to freely use profane hate speech, including calling Muslims ‘the secret column 
[1] of goat-fuckers’ (van der Veer, 2006). Although van Gogh was sued for libel and slander on 
multiple occasions, his freedom of expression was upheld time and again. 
Van Gogh was murdered by a Dutch-born Moroccan man who had been raised in 
Amsterdam. The fact that van Gogh’s murderer was Dutch-born and considered ‘well-educated 
and well-integrated’ was cause for generalized panic and fear about the potential of ‘home-grown 
terrorism’ among Muslim youth (Buijs, 2009, p. 423). Those in favor of tougher laws and more 
restrictive policies against immigrants and Muslims used the murder as evidence that a 
multicultural society had failed (van der Veer, 2006; Vasta, 2007). 
Many of the participants in this study described firsthand experiences of the aggression and 
intense scrutiny that ensued after van Gogh’s murder. Aliah, a well-educated and successful second-
generation Moroccan mentor in her early twenties, shared that her experience of struggle and 
exclusion took a turn for the worse after van Gogh’s murder. Although Aliah had lived in the 
Netherlands her whole life, she no longer felt Dutch; rather, she felt like an unwanted outsider in 
the country she called home. The tension, the stares and the questions were a continuous barrage 
of micro assaults. After van Gogh’s murder, she was asked why she would not stand in his memory 
at an event commemorating his life, and her response was that she did not need to; after all, he was 
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a racist. She was told that her position was not very tolerant, to which she responded, ‘He wasn’t 
very tolerant was he?’ Instead of being protected from hatred, she was questioned about her own 
tolerance as a total contradiction to her freedom of expression. 
A ‘Backwards’ Religion 
Being religious is not hot in this society. If you have a religion you are medieval. That is the 
problem in dealing with the Islam discussion and also with Hindus and Christians. People don’t 
have respect for people who live by their religion. When we talk with our children the first thing 
they say, ‘The main thing in my life is Allah.’ And I respect that. But, the people around them, 
they don’t give a damn about religion. So they can never understand their way of thinking. For 
example, when they wear hijab, the Dutch people always ask a hundred times – that is typical 
tolerance of Holland – ‘Can you explain to me why you wear this hijab?’ They know the answer 
but don’t listen to the answer. And our children they explain and they explain ‘Oh, I do it for 
Allah.’ But do you think the Dutch people listen to these answers? Never because they have only 
one thing in mind, ‘I want you to say that it’s a way to repress the women. That is why you wear 
the hijab.’ So they are not interested in the answer at all. (Lars, a Dutch Surinamese youth 
worker) 
When asked to compare how they felt in their youth programs compared with how they felt in the 
outside world, youth participants in all of the focus groups raised concerns about the level of 
religious intolerance to which they were subjected in the larger social sphere. They indicated in 
multiple ways that religion was a significant part of their identity. All of the youth participants (n = 
25) clearly identified as Muslim on the demographic questionnaire. Additionally, they were asked 
to indicate on a scale of 0 to 10 their level of religiosity (with 0 being secular and 10 pious). The 
average level of religiosity for the 25 participants was 7.3, with more young people likely to check 
off 10 for pious (n = 7) than those identifying strictly as secular (n = 2). This internal variation in 
levels of religiosity among Muslims is conflated and deemed static by Dutch society, where they 
are thought of as a homogeneous group. During a focus-group discussion, 13-year-old Ibrahim 
worried that Islam was generalized as ‘a religion about violence’.  
While the majority talked about feeling accepted in terms of their religious beliefs by adults in 
the youth programs they attended, the young women’s group (aged 14 to 17) talked about feeling 
shame and anxiety and being misunderstood for their religious beliefs in other spaces such as 
school. Their shared experience of religious intolerance came through very clearly during a focus-
group discussion as the girls chimed in to finish one another’s sentences and add to their collective 
narrative. For instance, Samira and Suha cringed at the thought of having to explain to a native 
Dutch teacher why they might not be able to attend an overnight international field trip; in their 
perspective, the teacher would inevitably misrepresent their reasons for not being able to go and 
blame their religion. Reem, who spoke the least in the group, contributed that ‘there were other 
girls who didn’t want to go, or were not allowed to go by their parents. Then the teacher thinks …’ 
Samira finished her sentence, saying, ‘… she’s being oppressed, blah, blah, blah,’ indicating she had 
heard this many times before. Suha continued explaining why this scenario was problematic, 
‘because you don’t like to explain things all the time’. Yasmin interrupted, demanding her right, 
‘Yes, it has to be respected.’ And Suha continued getting to the crux of the issue, ‘And then defend 
again. You know!’ They were adamant about not wanting to be put in a position of having to 
defend their reasons for not attending a field trip or any other school event. Being asked over and 
over again about an issue or circumstance was emotionally burdensome. 
Also responding from a place of self-protection and preservation, 12-year-old Ahmed reported 
his approach to dealing with religious intolerance. ‘If they think bad about us, we can think bad 
about them too.’ He linked religious intolerance to Fitna, a film produced by parliamentarian Geert 
Wilders that had yet to be released, but whose effects were being nervously anticipated by the 
Dutch media (Cherribi, 2011). This inflammatory short film (de Vries, 2010) was meant to be a 
follow-up to van Gogh and Ayaan Hirsi Ali’s film, Submission (Essed, 2009). In it, Wilders equated 
Islam with violence, terrorism, mass destruction and death, and warned viewers of the dangers of 
Islam. Ahmed rejected Wilders’ (and society’s) claims that Islam was repressive to women: 
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Geert Wilders says that the movie will come because he wants to tell the truth, but that’s not the 
truth at all. Because the woman, women that wear a headscarf choose for it. They are not really 
forced to do so, because uh when they leave the house, they can do whatever they want, they 
are not being stopped by someone or something. 
The outrage and dissent the film ignited led the Dutch prime minister to publicly denounce the 
film, claiming it did not represent Dutch society’s view about Islam. Ahmed’s wisdom and ability 
to respond in an articulate matter to these complex and painful issues were indicative of the weight 
of Islamophobia young people must carry. 
Lars, one of the adults I interviewed, described religious tolerance in the Netherlands as a 
‘dictatorship of secularism’, explaining that the notion of religious tolerance was complicated and 
contradictory because while the Dutch claimed to value secularity, many of the values and norms 
they promoted originated from Christian ideologies. The double standard and lack of acceptance of 
Muslim religious practices were part of the discourse that constructed Islam as a ‘backward’ 
religion and its followers as ‘uncivilized’ and ‘uncultured’. Not only was the lack of religious 
acceptance a problem, there was also a clear expectation that one must renounce one’s religion in 
order to ‘integrate’ into Dutch society. Not renouncing one’s religion was perceived as evidence of 
this backward culture, and this refusal required correction (Fekete, 2006). 
Lars’ desire to reject an ideology that demonizes Islam and burdens young people came 
through during the interview. As a Dutch Surinamese man, Lars moved within his multiple 
identities with ease. However, when I asked him how Dutch values translated into what they tried 
to teach youth in their program, he moved to a more critical stance. His switch in pronouns from 
‘we’ to ‘them’ signaled more than an attempt to differentiate ethnicities; he was communicating his 
ideological distance away from those who ascribed to the Islamophobia he depicted. 
Lars’ comment (quoted above) depicted what Fekete (2006) called essentialism of Muslim 
culture that leads to ‘paternalistic justification of coercive state action’ (p. 17). Under these 
conditions, ‘the state has to act as the “good father” to liberate the Muslim child from her bad, 
biological and cultural father’ (p. 17). This theme justified the idea that Dutch people knew better 
and needed to interfere in order to protect children from their families. Further, Fekete challenged 
the positions of liberals and feminists, like Ayaan Hirsi Ali, whose film ‘was no more than the old-
age Orientalist sexual fantasy – a call to white men to save Muslim women from Muslim men’ 
(p. 16). These historically and politically entrenched layers of debate created a very treacherous 
path for young people to navigate. 
The notions that Lars described – that those practicing Islam were ‘backwards’, ‘uncivilized’, 
‘intolerant’ and ‘repressive’ – had been repeated throughout multiple levels of Dutch society and 
were the basis for a particular brand of Islamophobia. In the Netherlands, an increased presence of 
xenophobic political parties representing the right wing had emerged, beginning with the ‘Lijst Pim 
Fortuyn’, or LPF Party, spearheaded by Pim Fortuyn until his murder in 2002 (Koopmans et al, 
2005). Among the most public right-wing diatribes were Geert Wilders’ demands that Muslims 
should leave the Netherlands if they did not adhere to Dutch principles. The emergence of Wilders, 
and the anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim hatred that he continues to spread under the guise of free 
speech, has spurred a strong collective movement against racism and oppression. 
United Against Racism, a grassroots organization based in Amsterdam, organized rallies, 
debates and lectures to stimulate action and discussion to address the anger Wilders has incited. In 
March 2007, I attended an event held on the International Day Against Racism to address the 
controversies, fears and concerns many had about the messages being discharged by the extreme 
right. The posters for the event read, ‘Islam is not the enemy. Hate is not the solution. Together 
against racism.’ More than 2000 people were in attendance, with a screen set up outside the 
auditorium to serve the overflow. United Against Racism was attacked by the extreme right for 
holding an event that criticized a member of the Dutch Parliament at the University of Amsterdam, 
a state-funded institution. Furthermore, news media and liberal groups criticized the organizers for 
framing the discussion in terms of racism, as this would somehow trump discussions of other 
legitimate social problems. 
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‘We Are Allochtonen!’ 
To be effective as a popular discourse, intolerance must have its own lexicon. This language can be 
used to categorize, to sort and to draw borders and boundaries that serve to exclude or include 
certain people or groups. In the Dutch language two commonly used words serve to sort those 
who belong and those who do not: autochtoon and allochtoon. The word allochtoon (or plural 
allochtonen) is a recent addition to the Dutch dictionary and was created to demarcate the direct 
opposite of autochtoon, meaning ‘native’ or ‘indigenous’ [2] Dutch (Essed & Trienekens, 2008). The 
word allochtoon was first used in policy documents in 1989 (Guiraudon et al, 2005), and it includes 
foreign-born children and second-generation children who have at least one foreign-born parent. 
Some have called for extending this category to include children with foreign-born grandparents. It 
is a controversial distinction; many are concerned that it upholds the long-standing divide between 
included and excluded (Ersanili, 2007; Geschiere, 2009). Those who argue in favor of the 
categorization cite the value of having long-term statistical data about the integration of a third 
generation of immigrant-origin individuals. 
Concerns about the terms allochtonen and autochtonen are directly related to the negative 
implications and connotations the words carry, as Essed and Trienekens (2008) explain: 
Formal distinctions are made between western and non-western allochtonen, the former 
implicitly representing closeness to western civilization, to economic, technological and social 
progress. In policy practice allochtoon refers foremost to non-western ethnic groups considered 
disadvantaged or less integrated into ‘modern’ societies such as the Netherlands …. 
Ramifications are that allochtonen are informally considered and treated as second-class citizens, 
never quite Dutch, never quite the norm, always considered as aspiring, as problem, lagging 
behind. (pp. 57-58) 
As Essed and Trienekens (2008) articulate, the distinction is not just meant to sort immigrants from 
non-immigrants; it is also about history, power and class. The terms were meant to clearly define 
who belonged and who did not, and were later extended to designate which immigrants should be 
required to integrate (Geschiere, 2009). All of these connotations serve to divide the desirable 
immigrants from the undesirable ones. 
In spite of the negative connotations, I found that the youngest participants of this study 
claimed the term allochtonen. It was clear that many among the second generation had re-
appropriated the term and viewed the distinction it implied as an additive difference. In one of the 
focus groups, Reem said what many of her peers exclaimed in other groups: ‘I see myself as an 
allochtoon. I am an allochtoon.’ So even with its limitations and the criticism I heard from those 
representing the older generation (‘We don’t like that word’), the term allochtoon – often featured 
in rap songs and even on T-shirts – had gained currency in youth culture. In a sense, revalorizing 
the meaning of allochtonen allowed them to claim their difference. 
In a demographic questionnaire completed by the 25 youth participants for this study, they 
were asked to choose ‘all that apply’ from a list of national, pan-ethnic and religious identities. In 
response, three out of 25 young people identified themselves as Dutch, while three others selected 
the broader term European. Although all of the youth participants were born in Netherlands, the 
majority of them (n = 22) selected non-Dutch national or ethnic identities. They did not see 
themselves as both Dutch and Moroccan (or Egyptian or Tunisian) because claiming a hyphenated 
identity was not an acceptable practice in Dutch society and was, at the time, widely contested in 
politics (as in ‘one cannot be loyal to two countries’). Through their responses, they rejected being 
Dutch just as Dutch society had rejected them. During focus-group conversations, they separated 
themselves from the Dutch values and practices with which they did not want to be identified. For 
instance, they noted that native Dutch people did not take off their shoes when entering someone’s 
home, a practice that they considered disrespectful. While they did not deny their ‘Dutchness’ in 
the sense that they introduced themselves to me as being Dutch-born, they separated themselves 
from Dutch people in terms of their way of life, their standards and their values. They were 
engaged in ‘strategic use of essentialism’ (Spivak, 1990, cited in Singh & Doherty, 2008), 
representing their individuality while creating an alliance with others like them. They were proud 
of their rich, malleable and multiple identities (Waters, 1990) that included religious, linguistic and 
ethnic dimensions. 
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Knowledge and Symptoms of Intolerance 
For the young people in this study, the prevailing discourse of Islamophobia masked by the Dutch 
value of tolerance permeates their public, institutional and personal worlds. These youth, multiply 
positioned and multiply identified (Wodak et al, 1999), exhibit both the knowledge and the 
symptoms of what it means to hold the contradictions of a society that does not accept them. 
These discourses permeate the everyday lives of young people, including their experiences in youth 
programs, which serve as microcosms for the larger social tensions. The image of Dutch society as 
tolerant, open and accepting is challenged by the manifestations of racism and Islamophobia across 
contexts. 
In this liberal and veiled setting, tolerance serves to create what Goodey (2006) describes as 
‘repressive regimes of control and regulation’ that result in creating exclusionary mechanisms and 
in perpetuating social fears (Goldberg, 2006; Brown, 2008; Essed, 2009) of Muslim youth. While the 
language of tolerance can serve to exclude, the young people in this study reject the hierarchies of 
subordination, re-appropriating terms like allochtonen in an effort to represent themselves as 
individuals while creating an alliance with other immigrant-origin youth. In that it does not 
interrogate power, the liberal discourse of tolerance serves to further essentialize Muslims and to 
negate their reality. The repressive rhetoric of tolerance positions youth as culturally deficient 
while elevating the hegemonic culture (Yosso, 2005). Moreover, deficit culture views are 
subtractive (Valenzuela, 1999) and problematize important connections to family and community 
(Stanton-Salazar, 2001). Further, the binaries created by the rhetoric of tolerance (e.g. 
civilized/uncivilized, liberal/fundamentalist) support the notion that autonomy and independence 
are the best antidotes against fundamentalism (Brown, 2006). Instead of trying to destroy the 
cohesiveness of ethnic enclaves (Stanton-Salazar, 2001) by forcing young people to choose and 
stand in opposition to their communities and their own families as if they were harmful to their 
well-being and social progress, the Dutch state should encourage social cohesion within and among 
ethnic groups (Driessen & Smit, 2007). Under the guise of protecting Muslim youth, the 
paternalistic approach that is applied serves to further demonize and alienate Muslims from Dutch 
society (Fekete, 2006). 
Remarkably, within the context of limited opportunities, young people in this study have a 
wealth of knowledge and a sophisticated understanding of their discursive world. They illustrate a 
meta-understanding of their discourse-laden context as they move from objects to subjects of their 
own stories by naming the subjugated positions to which they are sometimes relegated (Dolby & 
Rizvi, 2008; Maira, 2009). They agentically and actively construct their identities (Sirin & Fine, 
2008) while resisting the dehumanizing categories in which they are placed. They are aware of the 
fears others have of them and the obstacles they face as a result of those fears, and they speak 
confidently as experts of their condition. 
While they are able to recognize oppression, the youth participants are left to cope with the 
strain, the anxiety and the complexity of it on their own. Enduring the symptoms and 
manifestations of Islamophobia weighs heavily on the youth in this study. Being knowledgeable 
about their subjugated positions means that Muslim youth need to protect themselves within a 
system of oppression. However, while they are able to recognize their experiences with oppression 
they do not often have the words to describe what that domination means. Nonetheless, in the 
interest of self-preservation, they counter the constant denial of their experiences within the 
dominant claims by constructing their own narratives. They are burdened by having to educate 
others in terms of their religious beliefs and cultures while trying to defend themselves from a 
hostile society (Zaal et al, 2007). Hypocrisy about religious tolerance leads to young people being 
constantly challenged about their religious beliefs and burdened by having to defend them. I argue 
that burdening Muslim youth with the responsibility of educating others about their culture, beliefs 
and practices is a misuse of power and privilege by the dominant culture. The repeated 
requirement of immigrant-origin youth to explain themselves and shoulder the burdens of society’s 
oppression can have an overwhelming effect on their identity and development (Phinney, 1990; 
Berry, 2001). 
My analysis intended to problematize and interrogate the well-accepted and normalized 
discourse of tolerance that burdens Dutch-born Muslim youth in inescapable ways. My goal is to 
contribute to an understanding of the oftentimes paradoxical ways in which the exclusion of 
Mayida Zaal 
120 
immigrant youth can be produced through liberal discourses aimed at being inclusionary. 
Furthermore, the study raises questions about policies that affect young people’s experiences of 
belonging and/or that serve to further exclude or marginalize a minority population. By presenting 
the resistance and challenges to the discourses within Dutch society, I aimed to do what Wodak 
and Reisigl (1999) explain as one of the primary functions of discourse analysis: ‘Discourse serves to 
criticize, delegitimate, and argue against racist opinions and practices, i.e., to pursue anti-racist 
strategies’ (p. 176). Through this frame, I aimed to focus not on the acts, but on the implications for 
young people’s lives (Maira & Soep, 2005). 
Policy Implications 
The policy implications for this study point to large, structural stress points. Policies and practices 
that normalize and support a culture of poverty framework with regard to Muslim youth and their 
families contradict efforts at creating a cohesive multicultural society. These repressive actions 
trickle down to the lives of Muslim youth, reinforcing and recapitulating social, political and 
historical inequities. In fact, the result of these contradictory practices is to assimilate Muslim youth 
into a permanent underclass (Rumbaut & Portes, 2001). For this reason, the policy contradictions 
that have created the structural inequities that exist need to be examined closely, particularly 
within education. The ‘educational attainment’ gap will not decrease passively with each passing 
generation as some in the Netherlands predict (van Ours & Veenman, 2003) unless the injustice 
that has been done to the current generation of youth is redressed. 
This study unearthed difficult and looming questions about structural inequities and social 
justice in a seemingly liberal society, such as: What would it mean for the Netherlands to become 
an inclusive multicultural society? Rather than develop policies that further marginalize its 
immigrant origin citizens, what can be done to support the future of multicultural European 
societies like the Netherlands? Are citizens of the dominant Dutch culture willing to embrace 
difference and truly integrate and live with ‘others’ equally, regardless of religion or ethnic 
background? More needs to be done at the social and political levels of society to address the 
negative discourses and to hold people, institutions and the state accountable for their repressive 
policies and practices. Certainly, these issues need to be addressed if young people are to be spared 
the damaging effects of intolerance and injustice. While there is no one simple answer that 
indicates cause and effect, the discourses presented here correlate with the ways young people 
experience discursive practices that diminish and devalue their lives. Therefore, even if the cause is 
not clear, the state and its institutions must at least agree to be a part of the solution. 
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Notes 
[1] The reference to ‘column’ is a reference to the system of pillarization that organized Dutch society 
until 1960s as a system of four pillars each representing a religious or secular group. 
[2] Native and indigenous are terms that also appear in government documents and policies to refer to 
autochthonous members of the Dutch population. 
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